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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.
Case No. 20050154-CA
CHRISTIKEELE,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
The trial court denied the defendant's Amended Motion to Terminate Restitution. (R. 94
[Amended Motion], 151 [Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law], 155 [Order].) See
Addendum A. No other matters are pending in the trial court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue I: Whether the trial court exceeded the authority prescribed by law in
calculating court-ordered restitution where the amount was not based upon conduct for
which Ms. Keele was convicted or admitted responsibility.
Standard of Review: When a trial court's order of restitution is premised upon
statutory interpretation, the trial court's legal conclusions are afforded no deference and
are reviewed for correctness in light of the statute's plain meaning. State v. Mast, 2001

UT APP 402, If 7, 40 P.3d 1143; State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
Preservation: At a hearing convened January 6, 2005, defense counsel argued that
any restitution ordered in excess of $280 was improper because it must have been
calculated from alleged acts or cases for which Ms. Keele did not admit responsibility
when, in 1995, she entered a guilty plea. (R. 171, at 6:14-23, 49:10-21, 50:14-20.)
Issue II: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding a hand-written
letter from a pro se defendant complaining about service and collection fees being added
to the restitution balance she was told she owed constituted a post hoc admission of
responsibility for the entirety of said balance, especially where the pro se defendant was
never informed of her right to challenge the initial calculation.
Standard of Review: An appellate court will disturb a trial court's restitution
order only where "it exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion."
State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Preservation: At the January 2005 hearing, defense counsel argued that the 1996
restitution calculation occurred illegally and without supporting evidence. Defense
counsel argued, therefore, that the trial court in 2005 should finally calculate courtordered restitution based upon evidence in the record. (R. 171, at 4:23-5:2, 6:8-23.)
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1995 [effective until April 29, 1996]): Attached as
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF CASE
In 1995, three cases were filed against Ms. Keele: Case Nos. 951901411,
951901412 and 951901413. (R. 3-5; R. 171, Ex. 7, 8.) (The actual charges are
discussed in the Statement of Facts, infra.) On October 30, 1995, Ms. Keele agreed to
plead guilty to counts I and II of the first case, No. 951901411, and to pay restitution f,on
all cases." (R. 32.) The State agreed to dismiss counts III-V of the first case, dismiss the
other two cases in their entirety, and to not file any additional cases for alleged criminal
conduct prior to July 13, 1995. (R. 32-39.) At Ms. Keele's sentencing hearing,
December 11, 1995, the Hon. David S. Young, presiding, the State again recommended
"full restitution on all cases." (R. 170, at 7:7.!) The court ordered that restitution be paid
"as set by Adult Probation and Parole" ("AP&P"). (R. 170, at 8:23-24; see also R. 46
[Judgment/Sentence (restitution to be determined by AP&P)].) No further mention of
restitution occurred at the 1995 sentencing hearing.

1

The cover of the sentencing hearing transcript is dated January 11, 1995. The
actual date of the hearing, however, was December 11, 1995.
3

On May 16, 1996, AP&P received a memo from Smith's [Food and Drug]
Returned Check Department claiming that, with service fees added, Ms. Keele owed
Smith's a total of $17,319.44. (R. 171, Ex. 1.)
Ms. Keele, proceeding pro se, filed the Motion to Terminate Restitution in 2004.
(R. 77.) Counsel from this law office was appointed to represent Ms. Keele, additional
pleadings were filed, and a hearing was held. The court denied the amended motion to
terminate restitution on February 7, 2005. (R. 155.) The Notice of Appeal was filed on
February 14,2005. (R. 158.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1995, three cases were filed against Ms. Keele. The first was Case No.
951901411. It alleged as follows:
Count I: the defendant attempted to cash a forged check for $497, but did not
succeed (R. 3, 5, 33);
Count II: the defendant did pass a forged check for $100 (R. 3, 5, 33); and,
Counts III - V: the defendant possessed forged checks (R. 4).
The second, Case No. 951901412, alleged that the defendant received checks
stolen from a trucking firm, that the defendant passed one such check for $180 at Fred
Meyer, and that she possessed other stolen checks. (R. 171, Ex. 7.) The third, Case No.
951901413, alleged possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. (R.
171, Ex. 8.)

4

Based upon the State's documents and notations in the court file, Ms. Keele's
conduct as alleged in the three cases resulted in the actual passing of two forged checks
totaling $280: $100 to Smith's, and $180 to Fred Meyer. (R. 3, 5, 33, 171 at Ex. 7.) In
1995, Smith's and Fred Meyer were separate corporations and had not merged. See The
Business Journal - Portland (Sept. 9, 1997)(Smith's and Fred Meyer merged in
September, 1997) {available at

http://www.bizjoumals.com/portland/stories/I997/.

09/08/dailv4.htmn.
On October 30, 1995, Ms. Keele agreed to plead guilty to counts I and II of the
first case, and to pay restitution "on all cases." The State agreed to dismiss counts III-V
of the first case, dismiss the other two cases in their entirety, and to not file any
additional cases for alleged criminal conduct prior to July 13, 1995. (R. 32-39, 40-41.)
The Presentence Investigation ("PSI") included the following victim impact
statement regarding Smith's:
Smith's Food King took the loss on all checks forged by this defendant. No
statement was received regarding sentencing in this matter. Emily, with the
returned checks department of Smith's Food King was unable to provide
information regarding restitution in this matter. She indicated Ms. Keele's name
was on so many of the forged checks they are holding it would take them "some
time" to gather all of the information.
(R. 47, at 4.) The PSI does include a victim impact statement from Fred Meyer.
At Ms. Keele's sentencing hearing, December 11,1995, the Hon. David S.
Young, presiding, the State again recommended "full restitution on all cases." (R. 170, at
7:7.) The court ordered that restitution be paid "as set by Adult Probation and Parole."
5

(R. 170, at 8:23-24; see also R. 46 [Judgment/Sentence (restitution to be determined by
AP&P)].) No further mention of restitution occurred at the 1995 sentencing hearing.
Ms. Keele subsequently reviewed the "Special Conditions of Probation" with an
AP&P agent. Ms. Keele was required to initial each paragraph relating to the terms of
her probation. When Ms. Keele initialed the restitution paragraph, the space for the
court-ordered amount read, "TBD," or To Be Determined. (R. 152, para. 6, 7.)
On May 16, 1996, AP&P received a memo from Smith's Returned Check
Department claiming that, with service fees added, Ms. Keele owed Smith's $17,319.44.
(R. 171, Ex. 1.) The memo does not itemize the charges or list individual checks. The
memo does not indicate when the checks were passed. The memo does not indicate the
quantity of checks involved. The memo provides no detail about how the total claim was
calculated. {Id.)
AP&P informed Ms. Keele that she was required to pay $17,319.44 in restitution
on or about October 17, 1996, more than ten months after the sentencing hearing. (R.
152, para. 10.) Ms. Keele disputed the amount said to be owing, and was advised by her
AP&P agent to contact an attorney. (R. 171, at 16:10-24.) During the time between the
sentencing hearing and when Ms. Keele learned of the initial restitution calculation, she
successfully completed a 60-day inpatient drug rehabilitation program. {See R. 170, at
7:21-8:8, 9:6-11.) During the same period, getting on with her life and trying to be a
good person were uppermost in Ms. Keele's mind. (R. 171, at 37:7-18.)

6

Ms. Keele contacted Smith's in or about 1996 to determine how Smith's
calculated its restitution claim. Ms. Keele spoke to a man named Miller, who was the
supervisor of Smith's "Bad [sic] Check Department.'1 The supervisor could not provide
any detail as to how the total restitution claim was calculated. (R. 171, at 38:1-39:9.)
When Ms. Keele asked her AP&P agent how the total restitution claim was calculated,
she was told only that the $17,319.44 total was what Smith's claimed to be owed. (R.
171, at 39:13-19.) When Ms. Keele contacted Smith's on three separate occasions
during January 2005, Smith's could not provide any information about how much
restitution was owing, instead indicating that it had no record whatsoever of Ms. Keele's
indebtedness. (R. 171, at 32:11-33:2.) In 2005, the State assigned a paralegal to work
with Smith's to substantiate the initial claim, and Smith's was unable to do so. (R. 171,
at 46:25-47:4.) The State conceded at the 2005 hearing that Smith's likely has no further
evidence with which to substantiate the initial calculation. (R. 171, at 51:11-12 ["I agree
... we're probably not going to find anything further from Smith's records11].)
No court findings or order calculated either complete restitution or court-ordered
restitution. No notice to defense counsel that restitution had been fixed at $17,319.44
was provided. No sentencing hearing occurred at which Ms. Keele could object to the
amount of court-ordered restitution, which would have invoked her right to a "full
hearing" on the issue. No notice of Ms. Keele's right to inspect the evidence upon which

7

the amount was calculated was provided. No formal notice to Ms. Keele that she was
entitled to a hearing with assistance of counsel to challenge the calculation was provided.
Ms. Keele consistently worked at least 40 hours per week since 1996, and, despite
health problems and a limited disposable income related to attempts at starting her own
small business, she has consistently paid approximately $50 per month toward her
obligation. (R. 39:23-42:18.) As of the 2005 hearing, Ms. Keele had paid approximately
$4,679 towards restitution: $1,355 to AP&P; and, $3,275 to the Office of State
Collections (hereinafter, "OSC"). (R. 171, at 22:12-20.)
In May 1999, Ms. Keele wrote a letter to Judge Young in which she complained
that OSC's collection fees had increased the balance of restitution by more than $3,000
from the $16,014.14 she was told she still owed: "As of this February I owe $16,014.14
for restitution. After GC Services got ahold [sic] of my account they informed me I now
owe $19,897.12." (R. 171, Ex. 9.) The hand-written 1999 letter included no objection to
the manner in which the restitution amount was calculated, nor did it request a hearing.
{Id.) In apparent response to the 1999 letter, Judge Young first ordered Ms. Keele's
account returned to AP&P administration (R. 73), and then sua sponte reversed that
order "after further examination." (R. 75.)
Ms. Keele, proceeding pro se, filed the Motion to Terminate Restitution in 2004.
The pro se motion does not challenge the method by which the original calculation was
made, request a hearing thereon, or challenge the lack of notice and opportunity to be
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heard at the time of the initial calculation. (R. 77.) Only after the pro se motion was
filed, and this office became involved,2 was Ms. Keele's right to challenge the initial
calculation invoked. {See R. 94.)
At the 2005 hearing, defense counsel noted that said hearing constituted Ms.
Keele's first opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the initial restitution calculation.
(R. 171, at 47:20-24.) Defense counsel contended that, owing to the irregularities
surrounding the initial calculation, the trial court was required to conduct its own
calculation. (£.g., 171, at 49:8-50:1, 50:14-20.) The trial court, however, concluded that
Ms. Keele's 1999 hand-written letter (R. 171, Ex. 9) constituted an admission by Ms.
Keele that she owed the amount claimed by Smith's. (R. 171, at 5:11-17, 54:9-14 ["So
the court is going to enter a finding based on defendant's agreement and admission in her
letter, that as of February of 1999 she owed $16,014.14"].)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both Points I and II recall the same theme: the extra-judicial calculation and
imposition of restitution in 1996 violated the plea agreement, state statute, and Ms.
Keele's constitutional rights to due process and assistance of counsel; the trial court, in
2005, was required to address these problems by calculating both complete and courtordered restitution based upon conduct for which Ms. Keele admitted responsibility in

2

The notice of hearing that issued following the State's response to the pro se
motion was not addressed to this law office, but rather to Ms. Keele's home address in
Idaho. (R. 89-91.)
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1995; and, by not doing so, the 2005 trial court exceeded its statutory authority (Point I)
and abused its discretion (Point II).
Point I: The court exceeded its statutory authority by imposing restitution based
upon "criminal activities" for which Ms. Keele was not convicted and for which she did
not admit responsibility.
Ms. Keele agreed to pay restitution stemming from the conduct alleged in three
cases filed in 1995. The State agreed that no other cases would be filed that stemmed
from conduct prior to July 13, 1995. Evidence in the form of the informations, the plea
agreement and State counsel's notations thereon, and the sentencing hearing transcript
establish that the conduct for which Ms. Keele admitted responsibility caused
approximately $280 in pecuniary damages, including $100 to Smith's. Smith's,
however, submitted a restitution claim to AP&P in the amount of $17,319.
Pursuant to Utah law then in place, court-ordered restitution could only be based
upon actual conduct for which the defendant was convicted or admitted responsibility.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(b), (4)(c)(ii) & (8)(a) (1995).
At the 2005 hearing - the first "full hearing" at which Ms. Keele was permitted to
challenge the initial calculation - the trial court expressly based its calculation of
restitution upon a letter written by Ms. Keele in 1999 without assistance of counsel and
addressing an entirely different restitution issue. Most significantly, the 1999 letter did
not admit responsibility to any conduct; rather, it merely recited what Ms. Keele was told

10

she owed. By its reliance upon the 1999 letter, the trial court exceeded its statutory
authority by calculating restitution based upon sources not permitted by law.
Point II: The trial court abused its discretion by characterizing the 1999 letter as
an admission of responsibility, rather than calculating court-ordered restitution based
upon accurate and reliable facts.
Ms. Keele agreed to pay restitution for the three cases filed in 1995. Those cases
allege the passing of two bad checks that totaled $280. The trial court in 2005, however,
calculated court-ordered restitution based upon the 1999 letter written by Ms. Keele
without assistance of counsel, attempting to raise an issue unrelated to the initial
calculation of restitution, and merely confirming Ms. Keele's lack of knowledge of her
right to challenge that calculation.
ARGUMENT
Point I:

The Trial Court Exceeded Its Statutory Authority by
Calculating Court-Ordered Restitution Based upon Conduct for
which Ms. Keele Did Not Admit Responsibility.

In December 1995, the trial court was limited by statute to order restitution based
only upon conduct for which Ms. Keele was either convicted or admitted responsibility:
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order
that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution
as part of a plea agreement....
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) (1995); see Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l)
(2003)(the current statutory section that imposes similar restrictions). Criminal activities,
in turn, were defined as any "offense" for which a defendant was convicted or "conduct"
for which a defendant admitted responsibility. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(b) (1995);
J*? §77-38a-102(2) (2003).
Whereas "complete" restitution might encompass all monetary damages caused by
a defendant, actual "court-ordered" restitution was limited only to those damages flowing
from criminal conduct admitted by the defendant. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to
order restitution for conduct that was neither the subject of a conviction nor an admission
of responsibility. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(c)(i) & (ii) (1995); see Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-38a-302(2)(a) & (b) (2003). Even the provision that guided the actual calculation
of restitution, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(8) (1995), focused upon "conduct" for which
the defendant admitted responsibility. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5) (2003).
In State v. Watson, 1999 UT APP 273, 987 P.2d 1289 (per curium ), the trial court
inferred from the evidence that the defendant was responsible for certain criminal
conduct. This court, interpreting statutory language nearly identical to that at issue here,
held that court-ordered restitution could stem only from conduct for which the defendant
clearly admitted responsibility:
To conclude that [defendant] admitted responsibility for the murder and that there
was a sufficient nexus to hold her accountable to the victim's family for
restitution, the trial court examined and made inferences about [defendant's] state
of mind based upon the evidence before it. However, the statute is more narrow.
12

It does not ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's state of mind, but rather
asks it to focus on admissions made to the sentencing court. In other words, the
statute requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly established,
much like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution.
Id, at If 5; accord State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998)(court-ordered
restitution may be based upon uncharged criminal activity only if the defendant admits
responsibility therefor); Mast, at ^ 16-19 (vacating order of restitution based upon
conduct for which the defendant neither was convicted nor admitted responsibility).
Three cases were filed against Ms. Keele herein based upon her July 13, 1995
arrest. For purposes of court-ordered restitution, Ms. Keele admitted responsibility for
all conduct alleged in those three cases. The plea agreement executed by Ms. Keele, the
State and the trial court stated, "Defendant agrees to restitution on all cases." (R. 32.)
The trial court, therefore, in 1995, could not have based court-restitution upon any charge
or allegation outside those three cases.
In 1995, moreover, Ms. Keele was denied an opportunity to challenge the initial
calculation at sentencing. A defendant objecting to the amount of court-ordered
restitution at sentencing in 1995 was entitled to a "foil hearing" on the issue. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (1995); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4) (2003). Prior
to Ms. Keele's sentencing, however, the PSI (R. 47) contained no calculation of
complete restitution or a recommendation for court-ordered restitution. The sentencing
court calculated neither complete nor court-ordered restitution at the sentencing hearing
or in any court order that followed. Ms. Keele only learned of the initial restitution
13

calculation some ten months after the sentencing hearing - from AP&P. The trial court's
failure to calculate court-ordered restitution not only violated Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(a)(iii) & (c) (1995), but it denied Ms. Keele and her attorney the opportunity to
object to any such calculation. Having been deprived of the opportunity to object to
court-ordered restitution at sentencing, Ms. Keele was denied her opportunity to a full
hearing on any such objection. Serving finally as the "full hearing," therefore, the 2005
proceedings were crucial.
At the 2005 hearing, the court was required to consider evidence relevant to the
calculating court-ordered restitution. See State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, \ 20, 61 P.3d
1000 (while rules of evidence may not apply at the full hearing, "the dispositive question
is whether the sentencing court correctly concluded that the restitution amount was
justified on the basis of the evidence presented to it"). The determination critical to
calculating court-ordered restitution should have been: For what conduct did Ms. Keele
admit responsibility before the sentencing court. The answer, based upon the
Informations, the plea agreement, and the transcript from the sentencing hearing, was
that Ms. Keele admitted responsibility for conduct stemming from the three cases, which
caused approximately $280 in pecuniary damage.
The court, however, took a different track. It concluded that Ms. Keele's 1999
letter constituted an admission of responsibility upon which restitution could be based:
So that's why I think this letter from the defendant dated May of- in her
handwriting - of '99 is so crucial, where she admits that she owes $16,014.14. If
14

nothing - if the State wants to try to prove that there's really more than that
owing, and if there's some order that would indicate that more than that is owing,
I'll let them try, but that would be my starting point.
(R. 171, at 5:11-17; see also R. 171, at 54:9-14 [MSo the court is going to enter a finding
based on defendant's agreement and admission in her letter, that as of February of 1999
she owed $16,014.14"].) Everything the trial court found, concluded and ordered during
the 2005 proceeding was based upon its inalterable reliance upon the 1999 letter as an
admission of responsibility.3
When she wrote the letter, Ms. Keele obviously did not know she could challenge
the initial restitution calculation. Ms. Keele did question Smith's and AP&P as to the
basis for the initial calculation - albeit unsuccessfully, as neither provided any detail or
backup information. (R. 171, at 38:1-39:9, 39:13-19.) Clear from her failure to
challenge further the initial calculation, not only in the 1999 letter (R. 171, Ex. 9), but
also in the subsequent pro se motion (R. 77), Ms. Keele was unaware of her right to
object formally to the initial calculation when she wrote the 1999 letter. Especially
where Ms. Keele was unaware of her rights, the 1999 letter cannot be interpreted as some
sort of knowing and informed post hoc admission of responsibility for undefined,
uncharged conduct in addition to that alleged in the three 1995 cases. The 1999 letter
constituted neither a conviction nor an admission of responsibility for conduct. The

3

The appellate court is not limited to reviewing just written findings, but may also
examine findings "expressed solely from the bench...." Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d
1172, 1177 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
15

letter does not mention any offense or conduct outside of the three cases for which Ms.
Keele admitted responsibility. The letter recited merely what Ms. Keele was told she
owed.
As a matter of law, the 2005 trial court's reliance upon the 1999 letter exceeded its
statutory authority. It should have recalculated the restitution amount based upon actual
evidence of pecuniary damage Smith's suffered from the offenses and conduct alleged in
the three cases for which Ms. Keele admitted responsibility.
Point II:

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Calculating CourtOrdered Restitution Based upon Irrelevant and Conclusory
Evidence,

The trial court abused its discretion in denying the amended motion for
termination of restitution. An abuse of discretion will be found when no reasonable
person would take the view adopted by the trial court. E.g., State v. Butter field, 2001 UT
59,1j 28, 27 P.3d 1133.
The evidence before the trial court at the 2005 full hearing was that Ms. Keele
passed two bad checks in the context of the three cases: one check to Smith's for $100
(R. 3, 5, 33), and the other to Fred Meyer for $180 (R. 171, Ex. 7). The PSI provided no
additional evidence of pecuniary damage stemming from the three cases.4

4

The Utah Supreme Court's rationale for requiring the provision of PSFs to
defendants, set forth in State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248-49 (1980), applies with
equal force where, as here, the PSI, although received by Ms. Keele, did not inform her
what would be considered in calculating restitution.
16

As noted above, the trial court's 2005 calculation of court-ordered restitution
began and ended with its characterization of the 1999 letter as an admission by Ms. Keele
that she owed all that Smith's claimed. (R. 171, at 5:11-17, 54:9-14.)
The 1999 letter, however, was written with one purpose in mind: to complain
about the more than $3,000 added to the outstanding restitution balance, as initially
calculated, when Ms. Keele's account was referred to OSC. As noted above, the 1999
letter constitutes little more than Ms. Keele's ill-informed attempt to stop OSC from
making a bad situation worse.
The trial court's reliance upon the letter constitutes an abuse of discretion because
the letter - and the restitution balance it recites - flow directly from AP&P's illegal,
extrajudicial imposition of restitution in 1996. Calculation of restitution is a part of the
sentencing process. State v. Weeks, 2002 UT, @Tfl6 &n.8. Sentencing is a "critical
stage of a criminal proceeding in which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance
of counsel." State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982). Procedural fairness is
as vital at the sentencing phase as during the guilt phase of trial. Id. In 1996, Ms. Keele
was completing inpatient addiction treatment, struggling to get back on her feet, and did
not have legal representation. AP&P's imposition of Smith's claim upon Ms. Keele, ten
months after the sentencing hearing and without providing effective notice of her right to
counsel and a full hearing, violated her constitutional rights to due process and effective
assistance of counsel.
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The 2005 trial court's abuse of discretion is further illustrated by the inability of
either Smith's or AP&P to substantiate the initial restitution claim, thereby preventing
Ms. Keele from evaluating the reliability and accuracy of the initial calculation. Under
both the Utah and the United States Constitutions, due process requires that sentencing
be based upon accurate and reliable information. State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854
(Utah 1994). "Fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a
defendant have the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the
factual information upon which his sentence is based." Id, at 855.
Upon AP&P's extrajudicial imposition of Smith's $17,319 restitution claim ten
months after the sentencing hearing, Ms. Keele questioned both Smith's and AP&P
concerning its validity. Smith's was unable to explain how the claim was calculated. (R.
171, at 38:1-39:9.) AP&P replied simply that the amount was what it was because
Smith's said it was. (R. 171, at 93:13-19.) Even in 2005, Smith's not only was unable to
substantiate the basis for the initial claim, it had no record of Ms. Keele's indebtedness.
(R. 171, at 32:11-33:2; see also R. 171, at 46:25-47:4, 51:11-12 [State concedes Smith's
inability to detail the basis for the claim].) In 1995, Ms. Keele was deprived of her right
to evaluate and challenge the basis for Smith's claim. In 2005, the trial court's misplaced
reliance upon the 1999 letter similarly foreclosed any such evaluation.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court exceeded its statutory authority by relying upon the 1999 letter to
calculate restitution, where the 1999 letter reflected neither a conviction nor an admission
of responsibility for conduct upon which court-ordered restitution could lawfully be
calculated.
The trial court's erroneous characterization of the 1999 letter as a post hoc
admission of responsibility constituted an abuse of discretion where the 1999 letter was
merely a recitation based upon AP&P's extrajudicial calculation and imposition of
restitution, which themselves violated Ms. KeePs rights to due process and effective
assistance of counsel. The court further abused its discretion by foreclosing evaluation
of the accuracy and reliability of the facts upon which restitution was calculated.
The trial court's order should be vacated, and this case remanded to the trial court
with direction to calculate court-ordered restitution based only upon the conduct for
which Ms. Keele admitted responsibility in the plea agreement.
SUBMITTED this aj**day of June, 2005.

TACI
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO TERMINATE RESTITUTION

Plaintiff,
Case No. 951901411 FS
-vs-

Hon. John Paul Kennedy

CHRISTIEVETTE KEELE,
Defendant.
The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact
and the Conclusion of Law based thereon;
HEREBY ORDERS that:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Terminate Restitution is denied.

2.

The State Office of Debt Collection will continue to collect future restitution
payments from defendant.

3.

Adult Probation and Parole will continue to monitor defendant's payments to the
State Office of Debt Collection.

4.

The fine ordered at sentencing is stricken.

5.

Defendant will pay the ordered recoupment fee of $150.00 for her publicly provided
counsel.
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6.

Defendant will pay restitution, currently in the amount of $ 11,3 84.14.

7.

No additional collection fees will be added by the State Office of Debt Collection to
the restitution owing.

8.

The statutory interest on the restitution owing will be waived if defendant makes a
minimum payment of $100.00 per month, beginning on March 1, 2005, for a
minimum total of $1,200.00 per year. If the yearly payment is less than $1,200.00,
statutory interest will be added to the amount owed.

DATED this

2_ da y of /S%fUt^>

, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

5NORABLE JOHN mU\KENNEDSJ
Third District Court Judgk '*>* •'»OJ

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law in addition to the Order were delivered to Ralph Dellapiana, Counsel for
Defendant CHRIST EVETTE KEELE, by placing it in the Salt Lake Legal Defender box located
in the Office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney on this .^-~~day of
2005.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 1953-1994 by The Michie Company
Copyright (c) 1995 by Michie Butterworth,
a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc.
All rights reserved.
*** THIS SECTION CURRENT THROUGH 1995 SUPPLEMENT ***
*** ARCHIVE MATERIAL ***
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS
PART 2. SENTENCING
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1995)

FIRST OF TWO VERSIONS OF THIS SECTION THIS SECTION HAS MORE THAN ONE DOCUMENT WITH
VARYING EFFECTIVE DATES.
§ 76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed - Civil penalties — Restitution - Hearing -- Definitions Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with mandatory sentences [Effective until April 29, 1996]
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the
criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities
and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including
earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including the accrual
of interest from the time of sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for
extradition or transportation and as further defined in Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the
defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of
the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
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(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any
other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in
this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Section 77-38-2 and family member has the meaning as
defined in Section 77-37-2.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as
provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an order of complete
restitution as defined in Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
person in whose favor the restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution order in accordance with
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person in whose
favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the victim or department elects to
pursue collection of the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the
same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the
amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending
criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any
governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the
defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to
pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
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(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in Subsection (8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall
make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be entitled to offset any
amounts that have been paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the
same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the
amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time
of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay restitution
of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at governmental expense to
resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if any of the
following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is issued for an
infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i) shall be calculated according
to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (c)(i) applies to each defendant transported regardless of the
number of defendants actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated minimum terms shall
be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation
or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the court and
served on the opposing party at least four days prior to the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court
may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports received under
Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any
further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravation and
mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison, the
court may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recommendation of
the Board of Pardons and Parole, recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant
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in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater than
the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute.
(ii) The resentencing shall take into consideration the sentencing guidelines established under this section by the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served.
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its choice of sentence on the record at the time of sentencing.
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sentence that, if the defendant is released from
prison, the defendant may be on parole for a period often years.
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of a child, object rape of a child,
sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the
charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at
trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This subsection takes
precedence over any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an
offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person
directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all
relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a
victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric,
and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing
recognized by the law of the place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and
rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a
victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider
the factors listed in Subsection (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard
to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by
the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of restitution if the court determines
that the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution under
this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the victim.
MOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Former Title 76, Chapters 1 to 66, the Penal Code, was repealed by Laws 1973,
ch. 196, § 76-10-1401, effective July 1, 1973. Present Title 76, the Utah Criminal Code, was enacted by § § 76-10-101
to 76-10-1306 of the act.

